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Probably no field in the law has expanded more rapidly dur-
ing the past decade than Health Law. In his article, Health Law
Comes of Age: Economics and Ethics in a Changing World,1 a
review of Law, Medicine and Forensic Science,2 Clifford
Stromberg,3 former Deputy Secretary of the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services, had this to say about
the development of Health Law in the nation:
Health Law is booming. This field of legal practice hardly
existed twenty years ago; it is now becoming one of the
more important legal specialties. Until recently, practice
in the "medico-legal" field was largely limited to the de-
fense of hospitals and physicians in malpractice actions
and to occasional issues in criminal law. Today, "health
law" is a diverse and burgeoning enterprise .... These
developments reflect the dynamic growth of the health
industry. Health care is now the nation's third largest in-
dustry (after construction and agriculture), with national
health expenditures that exceeded $280 billion in 1981.
Health costs have leaped from about 4.0 percent of our
gross national product in 1960, to 5.9 percent in 1970,
and to 9.8 percent in 1981. Health care constitutes about
one third of the service sector and is the fastest growing
sector of our economy.'
Even in the short span of time since Mr. Stromberg's article
in 1982, health care has continued its rapid growth. In 1983, the
industry accounted for 10.8 percent of the Gross National Prod-
* The Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor of Law at New York Law School.
1. 92 YALE L.J. 203 (1982).
2. W. CURRAN & E.D. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE & FORENSIC SCIENCE (3d ed. 1982).
3. A partner in the firm of Dorsey & Whitney in Washington, D.C., formerly Deputy
Executive Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and consultant on
health law and policy to the Federal Trade Commission.
4. Stromberg, supra note 1, at 203.
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uct with health care costs exceeding $355.4 billion.5 The steadily
increasing expense of health care delivery, which have caused
great concern to the government, health care providers, and con-
sumers, accounts for a large portion of the health care boom.
But this phenomenal growth stems also from the rapid evolution
of medical science into areas unheard of less than a generation
ago.
In the past few decades, we have seen such innovations as
organ transplants, artificial organs, laser surgery, and highly so-
phisticated diagnostic and life sustaining equipment, just to
name a few. Physicians now have the technology to sustain,
often for long periods of time, the lives of patients who only a
few years ago would have died in a matter of days or hours.
Breakthroughs in reproduction and artificial conception, such as
in vitro fertilization, embryo transplants, and sperm and ova
banking have brought a new dawn of hope to thousands of infer-
tile couples:
Law and morality, however, have not evolved in tandem
with science. The state of the law has remained virtually un-
changed from biblical times. This has in many areas limited or
precluded entirely the efforts of medical scientists and in some
instances continues to do so. For more than a decade, the federal
government imposed a moratorium on federal funding for re-
search concerning in vitro fertilization and the development of
human fetuses.6 Only in the past two decades have laws on arti-
ficial insemination emerged; almost half of the United States
still do not have laws that address the subject. Guidelines to de-
termine who should choose whether to retain or terminate the
life sustaining equipment of irreversibly comatose patients are
conspicuously absent from the vast majority of statute books
and inconsistently dealt with in caselaw. The great nations of
the world, as well as the major religions, have yet to decide on a
single definition of "death." Even our own states are in disac-
cord on this vital matter. The role of psychiatry in the criminal
process has not yet been defined by the Supreme Court. It is
therefore only fitting that the Human Rights Annual explore
5. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PuB. No.
85-1232, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1984 (1984).




some of these overwhelming issues in health law, and hopefully
it will continue and expand upon its inquiry in later issues.
The following three part series of medico-legal articles dis-
cusses artificial conception, the withholding or termination of
medical treatment for the terminally ill, and the role of the psy-
chiatric expert in criminal law. In these areas perhaps lie some
of the most significant conflicts between law and medicine.
New methods of conception, such as artificial insemination,
in vitro fertilization, and embryo transplants have changed our
entire concept of reproduction. In the first of the medico-legal
articles, entitled New Methods of Conception and Their Legal
Status, Harriet Pilpel explains how these new procedures are
done and comments upon the problems they have created. Their
effects upon our law and morality during the past decade were
brought about by a not-so-quiet social and ethical revolution. All
fields of law have been affected by these changes, The very sta-
tus and legitimacy of the child born by these new methods, as
well as its inheritance rights, support rights, and parental visita-
tion rights have been called into question. As Ms. Pilpel points
out, this is an area that the law can no longer simply ignore.
Only fairly recently have some legal communities complied with
society's mandate to address these new techniques. Unfortu-
nately, the responses have been slow, inadequate and at times
contradictory.
The law can no longer afford the luxury of looking to prece-
dents conceived in a different age and at earlier stages of medi-
cal technology. The modern world is seeing not only a brand new
technological era in reproduction, but also the emergence of new
attitudes toward its implementation and even toward reproduc-
tion itself. The law must be bold in confronting both as their
swift progression gives rise to challenging issues of social concern
which must be decided on their own unique merits.
Although one can, of course, choose not to participate in the
newest methods of conception, one can hardly refuse to make
the difficult decision, which we face more and more often today,
regarding the termination of life. Professor Stephen Newman
probes the flipside of conception in the second medico-legal arti-
cle, entitled Treatment Refusals for the Critically and Termi-




The law thus far has been fairly uniform in dealing with
cases in which patients noncomatose have consciously refused
the continuation of life support systems.7 Courts have by and
large determined that the individual may even choose death for
religious reasons8 or to escape the deterioration of the quality of
their lives.9 The real problem, as Professor Newman observes,
arises with the severely, irreversibly ill comatose or incompetent
patients who are thus incapable of making their own decisions.
Probably the most heralded line of cases spring from In re
Karen Ann Quinlan'" and In the Matter of Conroy," both of
which vest the power to make the life or death decision with a
quasi-medical community group called an "ethics committee,"
along with input from the family and the physician. Other juris-
dictions have attempted to reserve the decision making for the
courts or court appointed representatives." Still others rely on
what the patient had expressed before becoming incompetent or
the substituted judgment of family members.' 3
Where should the emphasis lie? Who should play the great-
est role in making this critical decision? Professor Newman ex-
pounds on the type and extent of input which he believes is
needed from the family, the physician and the state. He points
out the dangers of leaving the decision to a sole entity, since
none can possibly assess all the information necessary for a fair
determination for the patient. Close relatives usually have the
best knowledge of their loved one's lifestyle, philosophies and
values and can make the best evaluation as to what he or she
would have wanted. The physician, on the other hand, knows
the severity of the illness, its prognosis, the extent and expense
of treatment necessary, and what the quality of the patient's
lifestyle will be. Courts rarely possess first-hand knowledge of
7. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C.
1979).
8. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744.
9. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1978).
10. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 933 (1976).
11. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
12. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
13. See In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 426 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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the patient's condition and base their decisions on hearsay and
expert testimony.
Professor Newman reminds us that "legal rules alone cannot
dictate the course of complex human interaction" and to that we
must add "nor should the emotion of the family members or de-
tached technical judgment of the physician." All three must
work together to arrive at the decision which most respects the
rights of the comatose patient.
While the first two articles focus on the problems created by
the newest medical advances, the third, entitled The Supreme
Court, The Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatric
Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbol-
ism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles' Heel by Professor
Michael Perlin, discusses age old medico-legal questions which
have yet to be resolved.
The insanity defense in common law has existed for over a
century. The evolution of both law and science has made only
subtle changes in its use. Through in-depth analysis of three
fairly recent Supreme Court cases, Professor Perlin explores the
issues that psychiatry has created in criminal law, particularly in
cases that involve a life or death decision of another kind-the
possible imposition of the death penalty. He discusses the
Court's views on the standards of the insanity defense, the ap-
propriateness and extent of psychiatric testimony in both "ordi-
nary criminal cases" and death penalty cases, the indigent de-
fendant's rights to a psychiatric expert witness at state expense,
and corollary constitutional issues.
Can the mentally disabled criminal defendant effectively
evoke the aid of mental health care professionals? Statistics
show that psychiatrists and psychologists rarely arrive at accu-
rate determinations as to the likelihood of a defendant to com-
mit similar crimes in the future. On the other hand, failure to
consider and explore the defendant's mental health can result in
tragic injustices. Under what circumstances and to what extent,
therefore, should courts rely on psychiatric evaluation? The Su-
preme Court, as Professor Perlin observes, is drawn to cases in-
volving mental disability like moths to the flame, yet despite the
myriad of cases it has addressed, is unable to arrive at any work-
able answers.
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The fact that law and medicine do not co-evolve is not in
and of itself disconcerting. But the law must not disregard its
responsibilities to confront the issues that science presents. Fair
treatment in cases involving the insanity defense should be one
of utmost concern. Is it strict adherence to out-moded concepts
and data, fear of controversy, ambivalence, or lack of knowledge
that keeps legislators and courts from acting? These new medi-
cal techniques are not fads; they will not go away if we just ig-
nore them; they are scientific innovations involving conse-
quences with which the law must deal.
